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‘In Search of Phantom Fortunes’:  Working-Class Gambling 
                        in Britain c. 1906-1960s 
     by 
    Keith Laybourn 
 
Preface 
This chapter is driven by my own personal interest. I was born in Barnsley in 1946 
and raised in the nearby village of Monk Bretton. My father was a miner who worked 
at Monk Bretton pit. It was this pit which kept the village together until it was closed 
down by Roy Mason, who was Barnsley’s MP, and the Labour government, in the 
late 1960s. As a youngster in the late 1950s I often took small bets for my father and 
mother to the local bookie on Saturdays, and occasionally ran for him when I was 
only twelve years of age. I was barely aware that ready-money gambling on horses 
was illegal but then it seemed to me that small-scale gambling was an accepted and 
essential part of the leisure of the working-class culture of mining of which I was a 
part. I recall winning a £1 on my first bet, of 2s 6d I believe, when Mr. What won the 
Grand National in 1958. Gambling seemed to me a natural part of the fabric of 
working-class life at that time and it was with some regret that I lost an income when 
the 1960 Betting and Gaming Act was passed and legalised the institutionalisation of 
off-course ready – money gambling on horses through licensed betting shops in May 
1961. Until I was fourteen or fifteen, then, gambling was part of my upbringing. 
Running beat doing a paper round which, thank goodness, I never had to do. It even 
beat going round the wooden seating at Monk Bretton cricket club looking for change 
that had fallen out of the pockets of merry and often inebriated spectators on a 
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Saturday and Sunday – although that could be profitable for I once gathered ten 
shillings from under the seats one early evening. I should explain that the cricket 
ground at Monk Bretton was at a steeply sloped angle which allowed batsmen to 
readily score fours down hill but made them struggle to score even one up the slope. 
Betting had been a boon to my finances until the licensing of betting shops in 1961 
which saw an initial rush of small betting shops give way to the large commercial 
companies of Hills, Corals, Ladbrokes and Mecca. Even Jordans of Barnsley sold 
their five shops, the first of which had opened on Huddersfield Road near the centre 
of town in 1959. Since then I have often wondered about working-class gambling and 
it has already led me to write a book and an article on the topic.  
    ********* 
Gambling is an endemic feature of British society in the twenty-first century with the 
National Lottery legitimising it from 1994 onwards as an acceptable way of raising 
money for both the community and sporting projects. It was not always so for in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries determined efforts were made by the National 
Anti-Gambling League (NAGL), and associated religious bodies, to control gambling, 
and particularly working-class gambling. The overtly class legislation that was 
introduced, and most emphatically the Street Betting Act of 1906 which made illegal 
off-course ready-money betting in public places, was largely ignored by the working 
classes who resisted the limited and telegraphed gestures by reluctant police forces 
and an enlightened Home Office to enforce the legislative impositions of Parliament 
with which they generally disagreed. Indeed, most detailed social investigations into 
gambling suggest that a majority of working-class families participated in both illegal 
of-course ready-money gambling as well as substantial legal on-course gambling, 
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mainly at greyhound tracks.1 The working classes liked a bit of a ‘flutter’, particularly 
on the horses, even if much of it was strictly illegal. 
At first, the leading anti-gambling organisation was the National Anti-
Gambling League, formed and financed by B. Seebohm Rowntree, a Quaker 
chocolate manufacturer from York and social investigator, from 1890 until it expired 
in the late 1940s. Yet its activities were supplemented by the Society of Friends at 
first and, from the 1920s, by the Churches’ Committee on Gambling, the Christian 
Social Council on Gambling and many temporary organisations such as the Christian 
Emergency Committee that was set up in 1927 to oppose dog racing. Driven on by 
Rowntree, the NAGL emphasised that gambling should be opposed because it 
encouraged the poor to waste their money, thus causing poverty, because it was 
considered to be a corrupting influence on women and children, and since it 
encouraged a culture of getting something for nothing. Thus, unlike many Christian 
critics, Rowntree was prepared to accept that gambling was a product of social 
environment and not necessarily a personal failing. His amended views on gambling 
appeared in Poverty and Progress, his second survey of York conducted in 1936 and 
published in 1941. What he believed was that the working class he was studying were 
‘in search of phantom fortunes’ and were wasting their money, although he came to 
accept that the gambling was small scale and regular. 
Many contemporaries attempted to resist the accusations laid against gambling 
by the NAGL and anti-gambling organisations, as will become evident later. In 
addition, many historians have challenged the various assumptions and dangers of the 
excesses of working-class gambling. Carl Chinn, in his book Better Betting with a 
Decent Feller: A Social History of Bookmaking, suggests that working-class gambling 
began seriously in the early nineteenth century before the rapid growth of the sporting 
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press, and that it was a small-scale regular activity by most working-class families – 
an affordable part of their family budget.2 Mark Clapson made much the same case in 
his book A Bit of a Flutter  in which he saw gambling as ‘a moderate, economistic and 
expressive form of recreation’, a type of self-help, which the authorities were finally 
forced to accept.3 Nevertheless, gambling and gamblers have had a bad press for most 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, Graham Sharpe, the Media Relations Director of 
William Hill, wrote, in August 2004, in a ‘Foreword’ to Carl Chinn’s book, that 
having moved from being a journalist to working for a bookmaker his mother said to 
him ‘From disreputable hack to unscrupulous bookie. All you need to do now is 
become an estate agent and you’ve completed the unholy trinity.’4 
 The introduction of the Street Betting Act of 1906 and the conflicts between 
anti-gambling and pro-gambling forces have led to three questions which will be 
examined here. First, was gambling an affordable part of working-class leisure or an 
impoverishing waste? Secondly, why was the Street Betting Act of 1906 introduced? 
Thirdly, why did it take fifty-five years for this blatant piece of class legislation to be 
by-passed by the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 - which allowed licensed off-
course betting offices to be opened? 
 This chapter will argue that, by and large, working-class betting was small-
scale, that the anti-gambling lobby was briefly effective between 1904 and 1906, and 
so made street betting illegal, but that it took more than fifty years for it to be 
removed from the statute book because even though the Home Office and the chief 
constables realised that it was futile to operate the Act, and to ban off-course ready-
money betting, there were many factors which delayed change. In particular the 
failure of Winston Churchill’s betting duty (1926-9) and the growth of the football 
pools, greyhound racing and the Irish sweepstakes lottery, in 1930, slowed down the 
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pace of toleration. However, in the long run British society changed and attitudes 
towards gambling did likewise. It was another thirty years before, from 1 May 1961, 
the Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 legalised off-course ready-money gambling in 
licensed premises driven on by the fact that political parties were becoming 
increasingly dependent upon  illegal lotteries, bingo and gaming activities and 
because society had become more tolerant of gambling in general. 
     I 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the working classes were involved in a 
variety of gambling activities. Apart from gaming with cards, and localised gambling 
activities such as crown green bowling which was particularly popular in Lancashire, 
they focused very much on pitch and toss and horse racing. Pitch and toss, which 
continued with some popularity until the 1950s, was popular in Liverpool; at 
Coldwell, near Nelson, almost every day ‘hundreds of youths and men gathered from 
all parts of the district’.5 It was also popular in the North East and Yorkshire although 
it varied slightly from region to region. Normally, however, contestants pitched at a 
target to establish who was going to act as the banker although that process was later 
dropped as bookmakers began to act as bankers. The banker would then establish a 
circle of punters around him and take bets. A thrower would toss two coins high into 
the air, so that they would twist, the punter hoping to get two tails to land upwards but 
losing to the banker if they landed with two heads upwards. One head and one tail 
would lead to the coins being tossed again. Tossing ‘rings’, or ‘schools’, were fairly 
common until the Second World War but persisted in only a few areas, such as 
Queensbury, between Bradford and Halifax in the West Riding of Yorkshire. 
According to one ex-bookmaker, Queensbury was ‘the daddy of the tossing rings’.6 It 
operated in a ring which was seven yards by seven yards and was often run by Jack 
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Harris, ‘a hard man’. At other times it seems to have been run by ‘Bump’ Roe.7 The 
tossing school normally took place near the Bradford Beck at Queensbury, near an 
abandoned farmyard, and on one occasion, according to a participant, when the police 
raided only one man, Crutchy Wilks who had only one leg, escaped by crossing the 
beck on his crutches when police officers decided to avoid getting wet in the pursuit.8 
 Nevertheless, it was off-course ready-money backing on horses which 
attracted most interest. Chinn suggests that a substantial proportion of the working 
class bet regularly on the horses in the early and mid-twentieth century. Many took 
their bets to betting houses, which were illegal under the 1853 Betting Houses Act, or 
to bookmakers who operated in the streets and alleyways of towns. The Street Betting 
Act of 1906 attempted to ban the latter activities. It is, however, clear that a 
significant proportion of the working classes, possibly the majority, still continued to 
place regular bets with bookmakers in their houses or on the street. The working class 
have always gambled but the modern boom appears to have begun in the 1870s and 
1880s when newspapers began to publish results starting prices and results. 
Illegal off-course bookies prospered in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. They often gathered at meeting and betting grounds such as Williamson 
Square in Liverpool, Farringdon Street in London, the Midden in Leeds, and other 
venues. Many extended their operations to factories where their runners or agents 
gathered bets and often used time bags to store them in what was effectively a form of 
credit betting which thus made the gambling possibly legal. Every type of shop – 
from corner shop to fish-and-chip shop - was used by some to cover their illegal 
bookmaking operations.9 
 This growth of bookmaking was underpinned by a culture of gambling which 
was developing throughout Britain. Newspapers such as Sporting Life, Sporting Star 
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and the Sporting Chronicle began to provide information about horse racing and they 
themselves began to organise competitions based upon the football pools and other 
forms of competition. This was undermined by the Ready Money Pools Act of 1920, 
only the second real success of the NAGL in the twentieth century, which ended their 
activities by imposing credit betting instead of ready-money betting on the punters. 
This meant that the punters could not be forced to pay up a debt which could not be 
pursued in law. 
 The working classes also increasingly participated in many gaming activities. 
Whist and partner whist were very popular but normally regarded as illegal, because 
they were initially regarded as relying upon chance rather than skill and were thus 
illegal under the 1823 Lottery Act. The Home Office generally took a lenient attitude 
towards whist drives and advised the police to ignore them although during the 
Second World War there was increased police action against card games, which were 
represented as being unpatriotic. Indeed, the Blackpool Chief Constable became 
obsessed with the need to stamp out gaming. So persistent was he that in one case a 
defendant, Mr.Bernard who was a corporal in the RAF, stated that 
 We are all fighting for freedom but what kind of freedom is this? I was 
 playing marbles at the age of eight. At 14 I was tossing pennies, a cruel 
 offence. At 17 I went into the Army and started to play pontoon and, worse 
 than that, poker, all offences against the law. Yet a wealthy man can ring up a 
 bookmaker and have a bet on a horse. I hope that we are fighting for the day 
 when we can have a game of cards when we want.10 
The working class were all too aware of the class distinctions that existed in both 
gambling and gaming. 
     II 
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These distinctions were encouraged by the NAGL which was formed in 1890. It 
began in York and quickly spread throughout the country but was remarkably 
unsuccessful in the 1890s. The original impetus for it had come from F. A. Atkins, 
editor of Home Words and the religious periodical Young Man who responded to the 
anti-gambling call of Hugh Price Hughes, the ‘self-appointed keeper of the 
Nonconformist Conscience’.11 Its main purpose was to vehemently oppose every 
form of betting and gambling. In its early years the League was led by John Hawke, 
the honorary secretary, and later by J. M. Hogge, who became secretary in 1906. John 
Gulland, an Edinburgh solicitor and Whitehall civil servant in the 1930s, joined at 
about this time and eventually replaced Hogge in 1919. The NAGL aimed to oppose 
‘every form of Betting and Gambling’ and to ‘diffuse among all classes of the 
community useful information; and to promote reform by legislation and effective 
administration of existing laws and bylaws.’12 These objectives were issued in all the 
copies of the Bulletin which it issued twice per year until it went quarterly in August 
1910. The Bulletin also published anti-gambling poems such as this one which 
appeared in 1895. 
  He saw a ragged-breek’d urchin run 
  A-shrieking out! ‘All the winners!!!’ 
  And the Devil smiled, as he sniggered, ‘What fun! 
  What a bait for the greed-fired sinners! 
  When the gambling demon is awake, 
  Half the imps may be idle snoosers 
  But wouldn’t it sell if I published – from Hell – 
  My record of ‘All the Losers! 
  Of all the primrose paths ’tis the Betting trade 
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  Leads straightest to perdition, 
  And all the losses each day (of their souls) I would say 
  Would fill a big ’Speshul Edition!! 13 
 In 1897 John Hawke won a High Court case, Hawke v. Dunn which ruled that 
a betting ring at Newmarket was a public place within the meaning of the 1853 
Betting Houses Act. The issuing of starting prices there was thus illegal. This 
judgement was overturned within four months by the Jockey Club when Charles 
Powell, a clerk at Kempton racecourse, obtained a share of Kempton Park and then 
issued a writ against the company for an injunction of restraint in contravention of the 
1853 Betting Houses Act which would force the authorities at Kempton to provide 
betting facilities. The contrived Powell v. Kempton case overruled the Hawke v. Dunn 
judgement. The issue was taken to the House of Lords but the Powell v. Kempton 
judgement was upheld. The NAGL was thus unable to stop gambling in the 
Tattersall’s rings on racecourses throughout the country. This forced the NAGL to 
drop attempts to control all gambling and to focus upon the easier target of working-
class gambling. It became convinced that working-class gambling was immoral and 
should be stopped. B. Seebohm Rowntree recognised that working-class gambling 
was rife, and studied it in his survey Poverty and Progress (1941) but suggested that 
the working classes would not gamble if they had better housing and living conditions 
and thus implied that gambling was a product of a particular social environment rather 
than a personal failing. The NAGL therefore led numerous campaigns to control the 
‘tipster’ press, and produced a large number of pamphlets that revealed the pitfalls of 
gambling, such as Betting: A Boy to a Bishop, The Gambling Tree and its Fruit, Shall 
I Bet? and Why not make Money without Working?14 From the 1890s onwards, then, 
working-class gambling became the focus of the NAGL which claimed that the 
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working classes wasted an enormous amount of money on gambling. The fact is that 
there is little evidence to suggest that this was the case.  
     III 
There are, of course, no precise figures for the level of gambling in Britain in the early 
twentieth century, although one estimate for 1905 suggested that the level of 
gambling had reached £50 million, and that there were about 20,000 bookmakers.15 
During the inter-war years there was much speculation that it varied between about 
£50 million and £500 million, and even occasionally some recognition that these 
figures were likely to be turnover and not a loss of income by gamblers. The Rev. E. 
Benson Perkins, of the Wesleyan Methodist Church’s Social Welfare Department, 
published numerous pamphlets and books during the inter-war years, including 
Betting Facts and The Peril of the Pools, and generally estimated that gambling 
exceeded £50 million per year although the figure was raised over time.16 The Royal 
Commission on Lotteries, Betting and Gaming (1932-3) received estimates which 
varied between about £100 million and £500 million. The NAGL regularly estimated 
the gambling bill to be about £350 to £400 million in the late 1930s.  
 Most of these early estimates were little more than wild guesses. However, 
they became more accurate from the 1930s onwards. Rowntree’s Poverty and 
Progress suggested that the working classes of York were spending small amounts of 
about one shilling per week on the football and one to two shillings on off-course 
ready-money gambling on horses. ‘One inveterate gambler told our investigator that 
he’d rather “have six penn’orth of hope than six penn’orth of electricity”’.17 The 
Social Survey of Betting (1951) suggested that rich men on £10 or more a week 
usually staked 4s. 6d. per week whilst much less well-off working men on £3 per 
week merely staked 2s. 6d.. Many women did the pools with their husbands, by 
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themselves or with group of friends or workers.18 The Hulton Readership Survey of 
1949-50 estimates were slightly higher with men staking 3s. 10d. and women two 
shillings. It reported that about one third of women bet on the pools, and that they 
represented about 20 per cent of the pools market although their average stake was 
small at about 3s. to 4s..19 This corresponds with the Sherman survey submitted to the 
Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) which indicated that 
out of 250,000 coupons submitted each week 65 per cent of the coupons were for less 
than 3s. and 85 per cent for less than 10s. The average for each individual, rather than 
each coupon, was estimated to be even less at 2s. 6d. during the 1949-50 season.20  
 From the later, more detailed surveys, it is thus clear that gambling was 
ubiquitous amongst the working classes. By the late twentieth century more than half 
of them gambled regularly on the football pools. Although there is no absolutely 
precise evidence on the extent of illegal off-course ready-money gambling on the 
horses, evidence suggests that it was endemic amongst the working classes. Where 
there is evidence of the amount gambled it is clear that the working classes gambled 
less than their middle-class counterparts, though this sum represented a higher 
proportion of their income from which they expected and got returns. In the end, the 
evidence supports the views of Clapson and Chinn that small regular amounts, rather 
than large pauperising sums, were spent on gambling by the majority of working-class 
families. This was a finding that did not go down well with the NAGL which 
persistently attempted to control working-class gambling through legislation even 
though it is clear that its major success, the 1906 Street Betting Act, was 
unenforceable and a waste of police time. 
     III 
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The Street Betting Act of 21 December 1906 amounted to little more than a page of 
text but it influenced, and occasionally dominated the way in which the police and the 
off-course bookmakers operated for more than half a century. It stressed that ready-
money gambling in public places was illegal and listed the penalties to those who 
were caught. It was the one great triumph of the NAGL but it took them five years to 
get the Bill passed. John Hawke, of the NAGL, had first declared to the Select 
Committee of the House of Lords on Betting that he did not wish to meddle with 
personal liberty but still desired that bookmakers should ‘be placed in the dock’.21 As 
a result Lord Davey presented a bill to the House of Lords in 1904. It was delayed and 
Hawke, oblivious of working-class protests, wrote to A. J. Balfour, the Prime 
Minister, in May 1905 stating that ‘May I implore you to help the Street Bill. There 
can be no opposition of any importance. Churchmen and Nonconformists are agreed. 
The Opposition will assent.’ 22 It took more than eighteen months for the Bill to be 
passed through the Lords and the Commons. Whilst strongly supported, one of its 
parliamentary opponents, C. Hay, observed that the Bill made ‘one law for the rich 
and another for the poor’.23 
 The 1906 Act attempted to stop the proliferation of gambling on the street that 
had occurred because of the 1853 Betting Houses Act which itself was aimed at the 
ready-money betting houses of the working classes and not at the betting clubs of the 
middle classes. Both acts operated against working-class gamblers and those 
bookmakers who offered betting opportunities for the streets, in houses, in shops and 
factories. However, both acts were ineffective in stopping gambling amongst the 
working classes and it is clear that police action varied immensely; it was intense in 
Manchester, routinized in Salford, and barely evident in Leeds. 24 Yet, whether the 
police took an active or passive approach, they were unable to stamp out off-course 
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ready-money betting. The Labour Party, which had supported the 1906 Bill, also 
began to express its concern at the class bias of the legislation in the 1930s. 
 The debates surrounding the Betting and Lotteries Bill / Act of 1934, which 
incorporated the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Lotteries and Betting 
(1932-3), including the decision to retain the ban on public lotteries, were primarily 
about controlling legal gambling on greyhound racing. Nevertheless, they provoked 
much wide-ranging comment about the class nature of existing gambling legislation. 
A typical view was that of J. Jones, Labour MP for West Ham Silverstone, who stated 
that 
 The evils of gambling are only discovered when working men start gambling,
 then it becomes a moral offence. I can go to Throgmorton Street to-morrow 
 morning and see a responsible kind of gambling: nobody calls it street betting. 
 In some streets in my division I can see detectives busily picking up an odd  
 man here or there who is taking betting slips. The other people can gamble 
 with impunity. Those who put a shilling on a horse are heading for Dartmoor  
 but those who put thousands of pounds down are not gambling at all; they are 
acting in a businesslike way. The Bill does not go so far as I should like it to 
go. If gambling is wrong, why not deal with it properly on a wholesale scale, 
and let gamblers go where they ought to go. There ought not to be one law for 
the rich and another for the poor which is the case today.25 
 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Labour Party, and many of its 
leading figures such as James Ramsay MacDonald, Labour’s first prime minister, 
were fundamentally opposed to gambling. Much of Labour’s opposition was, 
however, swept away in the general election defeat of 1931, two months after the 
collapse of the second Labour government. Indeed, in the discussion surrounding the 
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second reading of the 1934 Bill the less critical views of its working-class 
representatives emerged when Mr. McGovern, the Independent Labour Party MP for 
Glasgow Shettlestone, reflected that 
 I remember John Wheatley [Minister of Health and Housing in the 1924 
 Labour Government], when I was a boy of 16, reprimanding a man who was 
backing a horse. Wheatley said ‘I think you are making a great mistake 
because the bookies are bound to win.’ The man looked at Wheatley and said 
‘Look here John, you don’t know what life is. Some people keep rabbits and 
some keep pigeons, some indeed keep white mice, but my way of enjoying life 
is occasionally to have a bob or two on a horse. I do that to get a certain  
amount of enjoyment. Don’t take that away from me.’26 
It is clear that the NAGL and Church interests reached a crescendo of support 
in 1905 and 1906 which they were never to achieve again. They did not get bills 
passed on stopping advertisements on gambling before the Great War. They failed to 
make gambling on greyhound racing illegal on several occasions in the late 1920s and 
the early 1930s. They failed to get private lotteries banned in 1934, could not stop the 
football pools when they tried to do so in 1936 and failed to stop the Betting and 
Gaming Act of 1960 being passed into law with its creation of licensed betting 
offices. They had some success but their policy of outright banning of gambling 
almost inevitably failed. There were occasional victories, perhaps the most successful 
being the passing of the Ready Money Pools Act in 1920. This act only allowed 
newspapers to offer credit betting on their pools schemes and effectively killed off 
this form of gambling although the pools companies were able to get round it in the 
late 1920s by offering credit betting and ensuring that their customers paid up the 
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following week with their next coupon by organising a body to collect the names of 
defaulters who would be denied betting rights. 
 The difficulty of the anti-gambling forces is that they were small even though 
they carried influence in Parliament, divided by religion, and prone to disagreements 
on the issue of gambling. Within the Society of Friends there was indeed some 
disquiet at the fact that the Rowntree and the Cadbury families bought a number of 
newspapers to strengthen the Nonconformist press. Two of these, the Northern Echo 
and The Star, were sporting, tipster and gambling papers. From 1907 onwards both 
papers dropped their adverts for credit bookmakers and refused to publish racing 
results and the Star got rid of ‘Captain Coe’, its famous tipster. By 1909, however, the 
sales of these papers were falling. The Northern Echo’s sales of 30,000 in 1906 (they 
had been at 5,000 before the Rowntrees took it over) fell to 25,000 in 1909 after 
which the racing pages and reports were restored to recapture lost sales. B. Seebohm 
Rowntree also arranged with Ernest Parke, the editor of The Star, to offer up to four 
daily editions of the paper while reducing the racing and tipster content in each 
successive edition. Parke argued that ‘a reduction in the amount of racing information 
would lead to the curtailment of its circulation and the disappearance of profits’ and 
that this should not occur.27 With Rowntree’s permission he restored the ‘Captain 
Coe’s Chat’ feature. Paul Gliddon’s recent article suggests that it was not hypocritical 
for the major anti-gambler to take the decision to restore the tipster press to his papers 
for financial reasons.28 This as not a view taken by some contemporary writers. Sir 
Edward Fry in his pamphlet Betting Newspapers and Quakerism: A Letter Addressed 
to Members of the Society of Friends, published in August 1911, complained that 
‘The National Anti-Gambling League is largely supplied by members of the Rowntree 
and Cadbury families; those very men are themselves among the principal owners of 
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the Sporting Press.’29  The Unionist paper The National Review suggested that 
‘Captain Coe’ should be renamed ‘Captain Cocoa’, after the profession of the 
distinguished owners of the paper.30  
     IV 
The legitimacy of the anti-gambling position was further undermined by many chief 
constables and the Home Office who were doubtful of the dangers of working-class 
gambling. Robert Peacock, Chief Constable of Manchester, was strongly in favour of 
the 1906 Street Betting Act Act. In fact he wanted much stricter legislation to allow 
him to raid the bookmakers but was worried about the lack of working-class co-
operation.31 He sedulously applied the Act in Manchester until his death in 1926. 
However, most chief constables and the Home Office were critical of it over the next 
fifty-four years – although much of their criticism was equally aimed at the Betting 
Houses Act of 1853. The official line was that the police regularly prosecuted the 
ready-money bookies with vigour but there might be a few rotten apples in the forces 
who accepted bribes and turned a blind eye or pre-warned bookies of raids. The 
evidence is, however, that police regularly prosecuted bookmakers and often warned 
them of impending raids. 
Yet it was quite clear that in many areas the police and the bookmakers were 
operating a relationship, often based upon a mutual understanding rather than 
corruption, which saw the police effectively charging a rent for gambling in a public 
place. In Salford, for instance the police kept a record of 51 pitches in the ‘South 
Division’, returned in alphabetical order, and attached to a log book which covers the 
period from 1907 to about 1958. The most detailed accounts are for the 1920s when 
the log book indicates that every pitch was fined £10 in the courts on either two or 
three occasions per year following two or three raids.32 Canon Green of Manchester in 
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fact provoked a debate about this when he spoke at Durham Cathedral on 19 
November 1932. He stated that 
Gambling is a grave source of corruption in the police. I do not say that all the 
police are corrupt. But some of them undoubtedly bribed. How does the bribery 
occur? The officer will go the bookmaker and say that ‘It is time you were on 
the carpet. Put a dummy at the end of the street and I will take him.’ The 
bookmaker puts in his dummy, the police fine him, and he is fined £10 or a 
month in prison. If he likes to have him fined he gets a sovereign for the job. If 
he goes to goal he gets £10.33 
The resulting debate, between the Manchester and Salford police and Green, raged in 
the Manchester Guardian over the next two weeks with John Maxwell, Chief 
Constable of Manchester, demanding, but not getting, evidence from Green. 
 Mr. Jordan, who ran an illegal betting shop on Huddersfield Road in Barnsley 
in 1959, has stated that ‘he had no problem with the police’ and recalls how on one 
occasion he was given prior warning and raided only to have the same officers come 
in the following week to place a bet.34 He noted that in the working-class community 
of Barnsley ‘everyone had a bet’. Ken Overton, a Birmingham bookmaker, vaguely 
referred to the Leeds situation where ‘the whole of the police from the chief constable 
down was conniving at the people breaking the law’ and the Chief Constable was 
sacked.35 The control of off-course ready-money betting was clearly not working. 
 The Select Committee on Betting Duty, chaired by Sir Henry Cautley in 1923, 
was one of the first opportunities for the senior police officers to complain that the 
1906 Act was unenforceable and placed strain upon the relations between the police 
and the public. The Chief Constable of Liverpool stated that legalisation would make 
little difference for ‘It is easy now; if you want to bet you can do it.’36 Cautley 
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subsequently emphasised that that police officers told the same story ‘that betting was 
the only crime…in which the sympathy of the public was always with the offenders 
and the hostility of the public invariably against the police’.37 The Home Office was 
concerned about this in its annual meetings with the chief police constables and in the 
1940s surveyed their opinions on the 1906 Act. The vast majority were in favour of 
the 1906 Act being withdrawn and the Chief Constable of Leicester added that ‘I am 
unable to find any evidence to show that it is in any considerable degree the cause of 
crime and lawlessness.’38 In 1950 Sir Harold Scott, Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis, presented a twelve-page report to the Royal Commission on Betting, 
Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) in which he stated that the Street Betting Act was 
‘class legislation because persons in a good status of life can bet on credit without 
breaking the law’, and that its enforcement ‘does nothing to improve relations 
between the Police and the public’.39 He added that the 1906 and 1853 acts were a 
waste of time for ‘in the K Division [of the Metropolitan area] where illegal betting 
was rife there were 577 arrests in 1948’ for which an ‘estimated’16,000 man hours 
had been expended to imprison one person.40 He added that ‘Since experience has 
shown the impossibility of suppressing cash betting of course it would be better to 
legalise it under strict control.’41 
 The overwhelming body of evidence suggests that the police felt that the 
implementation of the 1906 Act, and related legislation, was a waste of time and 
money to control something which was essentially immoral but not normally criminal. 
This was an attitude which was also evident in the Home Office. The Cautley 
Commission of 1923 had revealed the failure of the 1906 Act and had encouraged it 
to consider the possibility of a Betting Duty, an unsuccessful version of which 
operated between 1926 and 1929. The Home Office was also interested in the 
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relaxation of the implementation of the rules on gaming and lotteries. Many card 
games, such as whist, were considered to be lotteries and subject to the 1823 Lotteries 
Act ban if they were played for money and unless there was an element of skill rather 
than chance in the game. In a series of memorandums from 1913 to the 1930s, the 
Home Office emphasised to the police that if whist, and other card games, were small 
scale then no action should be taken against them.42 Indeed, the 1921 Memorandum 
of E. Shortt, Home Secretary, advised that it ‘would not be politic to interfere with 
whist drives of an innocuous nature’.43 When the Royal Commission on Lotteries and 
Betting (the Rowlatt Commission) reported in 1932/33 and wanted the totalisator at 
greyhound tracks made illegal – which would have made an aspect of on-course 
ready-money gambling illegal at greyhound tracks but not at the more middle-class 
attended horse tracks – the Home Office ensured that that did not become part of the 
1934 Betting and Lotteries Act.44  
 The fact is that the Home Office, just as much as the police was anxious to get 
rid of unnecessary legislation in gambling and gaming which might be seen as 
socially divisive. Indeed, it was J. R. Clynes, Home Secretary of the Labour 
Government of 1929 to 1931, who summarised this position in 1930 stating that ‘I am 
glad to have had an opportunity of making this statement, which ought to dispose 
once and for all the suggestion that there is “one rule for the rich and one for the 
poor”’.45 The Chief Constable of Manchester informed Clynes on 28 March 1930 that 
his aim was ‘to promote reasonable uniformity in the enforcement of the law and the 
avoidance of anything which might suggest partiality or discrimination’.46 
     VI 
If both the police and the Home Office were intent on removing some of the 
legislation on working-class gambling, such as the 1906 Street Betting Act, during the 
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1920s and the beginning of the 1930s why did this not occur until the 1960s? The 
1853 Betting Houses Act and the Street Betting Act of 1906 were practically 
unenforceable since a majority of the nation ignored them. Gaming and lotteries were 
a minefield which the Home Office was prepared to ignore as long as criminal groups 
did not become involved. Everything seemed to be set up for immediate and 
fundamental changes but nothing happened. 
 It is not easy to establish why there was a delay for another thirty years but it 
would appear that the Home Office and the police had to give way to the fears of 
Parliament. The fact is that in the late 1920s and early 1930s the more liberal attitude 
to gambling was possibly set back by three factors: the equivocation of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), the failure of the Betting Duty of 1926 to 1929, 
and the new developments in gambling. 
 The first of these factors, the PLP, has been the subject of a recent article 
which argues that it was unequivocally opposed to gambling until the 1931 general 
election swept away much of the old PLP, which fell from 291 to 52 MPs; thereafter 
there was more equivocation as the new body of Labour MPs often opposed gambling 
but objected to the class discrimination in gambling. This has already been touched 
upon earlier in this chapter. However, the central point to stress here is that whilst 
Labour MPs took a more relaxed attitude towards gambling and gaming some 
retained the lifelong hostility to gambling. Clem Attlee, later a Labour Prime 
Minister, Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health responsible for introducing the 
National Health Service, George Lansbury, Labour Leader from 1931 to 1935, and 
others voted against a private member’s Lottery Bill in 1932 which was designed to 
raise money for British hospitals; Bevan and George Thomas, a later Speaker of the 
House of Commons and a life-long Methodist, opposed the 1934 Betting and 
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Lotteries Bill. Most of the Labour MPs mentioned, and others, were to be found 
voting against gambling, and the Labour Party today can show remarkable mood 
changes, as they have done recently in 2006 and 2007 on the issue of the 
‘supercasino’. If Labour could no longer be relied upon to oppose gambling then they 
could also not be relied upon to support it. There were also other factors at play. 
 Winston Churchill had introduced a Betting Duty on gambling in 1926, aimed 
mainly to raise money from the legal on-, and off-, course credit bookmakers.  
Churchill’s duty was to be based upon a 5 per cent duty on stakes and was to be 
supplemented by a £10 certificate to be paid by bookmakers in order to raise £6 
million. In the end the duty was raised at 2 per cent for on-course and 3.5 per cent for 
off-course credit bookies. By 1928 the figures were down to 1 per cent and 2 per cent, 
respectively. And the duty was removed altogether in April 1929.47 The fact is that 
bookmakers simply did not pay the duty the duty; James Maclean, a large off-course 
credit bookmaker in Scotland, paid £48,000 duty in 1927 and claimed that it put him 
at a disadvantage with the many credit bookmakers who did not pay.48 As a result the 
duty raised only £2,700,000 in its best year, 1928. Customs and Excise were reluctant 
to become involved in such a scheme again and the Home Office developed doubts 
about licensing off-course bookmakers.49 
 As if an equivocal Labour Party and a failed betting duty were not sufficient a 
check there was also the problem of the rapid rise of new gambling opportunities - the 
Irish Hospital Sweepstake Lottery, the growth of the football pools and, perhaps most 
damaging of all, the runaway success of greyhound racing. All three helped to 
determine the voting of MPs, many of whom were more positive to gambling than 
their predecessors. 
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 The Irish Sweepstake Lottery was begun in November 1930 by Richard 
Duggan, a Dublin bookmaker, and by March 1932 there had been four sweepstake 
draws that had raised £13,800,000 – of which £2,800,000 went to the twenty-three 
Irish hospitals involved in the lottery.50 The first sweepstake was a flamboyant and 
attractive proposition for the British punter. It was drawn in the Plaza Cinema, Dublin 
Irish nurses turned the barrel as a blind boy pulled out the numbers under the scrutiny 
of General O’Duffy, the Commissioner of Police. 51 The tickets were ten shillings 
each and were based upon the result of the Manchester November Handicap. It was an 
instant success and there were normally up to three draws per year afterwards based 
upon the Derby, the Grand National, and other classic races. 
 The concern of the British government was that a considerable number of 
tickets, possibly up to £3 million worth, per draw, were purchased by British 
punters.52 Indeed, the Post Office had opened up 9,000 letters headed to Dublin to try 
to stop the illegal movement of tickets.53 Any suggestion that public lotteries would 
be legalised in Britain was quickly rejected because of the state fear that it ‘would be 
followed by an immense increase in gambling among all classes’.54 In the end, the 
situation did not get any worse, perhaps because of the development of other 
gambling activities. 
 The growth of the football pools seemed more threatening to the government. 
Although the football pools had emerged in Lancashire before the Great War, and 
been developed in various forms in the newspapers, their great growth occurred 
during the inter-war years. H. Littlewoods was formed by H. Littlewoods and John 
Moores in 1922. From then onwards they mushroomed and although official figures 
omit the fixed odds given by bookies, it is estimated that by 1938-9 at least 
£22,500,000 was being spent per year by about a regular six and a half million 
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punters. This figure fell to about £3,500,000 in 1941-2, during the Second World War, 
but recovered to reach around £66,000,000 per year in 1947-8.55.  It would appear that 
about half the adult population bet on the pools at some stage in the football season 
and B. Seebohm Rowntree reflected that half the 25,000 or so families in York were 
betting on the pools and that postal order demand, mainly for 6d. postal orders, rose 
from 5,300 in a normal week to 17,828 per week in the football season.56 There were, 
indeed, up to a hundred companies to bet with in the 1920s although the number 
gradually slimmed down. Apart from Littlewoods the firms included Vernons, 
Shermans, Zetters, Copes, Socopools, W. S. Strange (Edinburgh), T. Strange 
(Edinburgh), Western Pools (Newport), and Gamaco Football Pools (Leeds). 
 What worried the authorities and Parliament in the inter-war years is that the 
pools companies got round the Ready Money Football Pool Act of 1920 - which was 
designed to stop the growth of a variety of pools competitions in newspapers by 
insisting that they should be based upon credit betting – by setting up an organisation 
which would check upon defaulters and deny credit and payment to them. It should be 
remembered that gambling debts could not be recovered in the courts under the 1845 
Betting Act. In addition, there was strong pressure placed upon MPs by the football 
authorities who were strongly opposed to their football fixtures being used for the 
pools. Sir Charles Clegg, a Nonconformist and Chairman of the Football Association 
in the 1920s, stated that ‘if betting gets hold of football, the game is done for’.57 The 
real fear was that gambling would lead to corruption with players becoming 
connected with pools companies, as occasionally occurred.58  
 The peak of the reaction against the pools occurred in 1935 and 1936 when 
Charles H. Sutcliffe, a Methodist who became the new president of the Football 
League, pressed the FA Council to ban the advertising of pools coupons in the 
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football programme at a meeting on 7 October 1935. He also persuaded the FA to 
withhold the publication of football fixtures until the Thursday or Friday before the 
fixtures were to be played, although the restriction only lasted for two weeks in 
February and March 1936. The Football League also claimed copyright over fixtures 
in the ‘Pools War’. The issue continued for a number of years and was not finally 
settled until 1958 when Littlewoods eventually paid a substantial sum of money to the 
League.59 
 The public and parliamentary concerns about the football pools were 
substantial but not as great as those connected with greyhound racing. After a failed 
attempt to introduce it in the 1870s the first successful greyhound track was opened in 
Britain at Belle Vue, Manchester, on 24 July 1926. There were 1,700 people at the 
first meeting but by the spring of 1927 Belle Vue was attracting crowds of up to 
25,000. By the end of 1927 there were forty tracks in operation and about 120 
companies about to open. By early 1931 there were about 170-175 tracks, another 
fifty-five organisations held licences to open tracks, and there were about eighteen 
million attendances at the official tracks. By 1936 about nineteen million attendances 
were recorded at the National Greyhound Racing Club tracks, although there may 
have been up to thirty-eight million attendances if all the tracks were to be included.60 
The rate of development was staggering and worrying for the authorities and anti-
gamblers. 
 There was an immediate reaction against greyhound racing from the NAGL, 
the Evangelical Free Churches and other anti-gambling groups. They feared that the 
working classes would be increasingly encouraged to gamble and fall into poverty. 
On the 27 October the Manchester Watch Committee called upon the Home Secretary 
to introduce legislation to abolish greyhound racing, complaining of ‘carelessness’ 
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and contempt for ‘morality’ amongst the young of Manchester.61 On 13 December 
1927 Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote a letter to the Home 
Secretary, warning him of the spectacle of the ‘animated roulette boards’ brought 
about by the development of greyhound racing.62 In 1928 the Home Secretary 
informed the Cabinet that ‘The principal objection against dog racing is that it is a 
mushroom growth which threatens to add enormously to betting facilities and, in 
particular, for betting by many whose means would not permit of their attending horse 
races.’63 At the same time John Buchan MP, the famous novelist, enlisted the support 
of 100 Labour, 50 Conservative and 30 Liberal MPs to press for the Dog Racing 
(Local) Bill designed to give local authorities the right to license or not to license 
local greyhound tracks. In supporting the second reading of the Bill on 11 May 1928 
he condemned the ‘illuminated ribbon of turf’ that was threatening to substantially 
increase working-class gambling.64 In mid-July 1928, however, the Bill was 
withdrawn having been lost in the labyrinth of the Committee stage. 
 Despite this setback for the NAGL and the anti-gambling fraternity there was 
still strong opposition to greyhound racing. The development of the Tote, or 
totalisator on greyhound tracks was seen as worrying by the authorities, even more so 
when in 1933 it appeared that the use of the totalisators was illegal on greyhound 
tracks, although it was soon made legal by the Betting and Lotteries Act of 1934. 
There was, indeed, great concern in the government at the potential that greyhound 
racing might increase working-class gambling and cause poverty. Indeed, in 
introducing the 1934 Betting and Lotteries Bill, Sir John Gilmour, the Home 
Secretary, ignored some of the advice of the Royal Commission on Lotteries and 
Betting (1932-3) and declared that the Government ‘is entirely concerned with the 
effect of gambling on the social life of the country’. He added that ‘My main 
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proposals of the Bill did not interfere with private gambling, but only interfere with 
social problems as may be regarded as of serious moment to the country.’65 He 
concluded, using comments that had circulated Whitehall for several years, that 
 The position as I see it, and as the Government see it, has been materially 
 changed since the development of greyhound racing since 1926. There are 
 only seven horse racecourses within 15 miles of Charing Cross, with 187 days 
 of racing, whereas in the same area there are 23 greyhound tracks with over 
 4,000 days racing within a year. Greyhound racing has brought on-the-course 
 betting facilities, often as almost a nightly event, into most of the large urban 
 centres of the country.66  
There was, indeed, alarm at the prospects that greyhound racing offered to working-
class gambling. 
 Both the NAGL and the Government worried about the impact of greyhound 
racing on women and children and the way in which it encouraged a ‘something for 
nothing’ attitude. In 1927 the Home Office received reports that of all attendees at 
greyhound meetings ‘30 per cent were women and girls’.67 In 1934 various 
parliamentarians noted the facilities offered for children. The Cartyne track, near 
Glasgow, had established a nursery ‘So that mothers can leave their children in the 
nursery while they go and gamble’ and Harringay track, in North London, provided 
an equipped playground where children could be left: ‘[t]wo see-saws, and a round 
sandpit complete with spades and buckets are some of the amusements provided for 
kiddies.’68 John McGovern, the Independent Labour Party MP for Glasgow 
Shettlestone in which the Cartyne track was situated, agreed that it was ‘a most 
degrading sight’ to see women taking their children to the nurseries on this track.69 
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 Nevertheless, the main criticism was that many greyhound tracks were 
running unregulated, and possibly illegal, totalisators where the owners determined 
how much of the total fund arising from all those who bet would be returned in 
winnings. As already noted many greyhound tracks ran their own totalisator in 
competition with the track bookies between 1928 and 1933, when they were found to 
be illegal, and from 1934 onwards when they operated under the conditions and 
controls of the 1934 Betting and Lotteries Act. Prior to 1933 the owners often kept 
about twelve per cent of the tote fund from bets for their expenses and profits but after 
the 1934 Act that was restricted to six per cent of the fund. Prior to 1934 there were 
claims of exploitation by the owners of the tracks who set up their own totalisators. 
Indeed, it was claimed of a Manchester company formed in 1931 (presumably the 
White City in Manchester although it could have been the Salford Albion) using a 
totalisator that it 
 …in 1931 declared a dividend of £212,000. One man invested £100 and has 
 been paid £6,000 a year ever since. Another guaranteed the company at the 
bank for a few thousand pounds, and he has drawn over £7,000 a year ever  
since. These fellows ought to be on the means test and know the meaning of 
poverty. King Solomon’s mines cannot compare with the money that has been 
raked out of greyhound racing and yet these people tell us that it is clean, 
honest and fair as any sport.70 
In effect, then, the decade between the mid-1920s and the mid-1930s saw 
government, the Home Office and Parliament fear the increasing opportunities for 
working-class gambling and doubt whether or not licensing gambling could be 
successful. It was these fears and concerns that appear to have checked the liberalising 
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attitude of the police and the Home Office. Yet, after another quarter of a century off-
course ready-money gambling was legalised through the licensing of betting offices. 
     VII  
Between the 1930s and 1960 the attitudes towards gambling changed. Most of this 
seems to have occurred after the Second World War for at this time gambling on the 
pools and greyhound racing was strictly controlled – the football pools being reduced 
to about a fifth of their late 1930s level and gambling on greyhound racing being 
reduced slightly between 1930 and 1942 before recovering strongly.71 In the late 
1940s the situation of working-class gambling did not change much but in the 1950s 
and the 1960s there were widespread cultural and legal changes occurring in British 
society – connected with sexuality, censorship, abortion, music and other cultural 
features – that marked these years out as a period of liberalisation. In addition, the 
final report of the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gambling (1949-51), 
better know as the Willink Report, contained a chapter on ‘The Social Effects of 
Gambling’ which concluded that gambling was generally not dangerous to the 
individual, family and community unless taken to excess: ‘It is the concern of the 
State that gambling, like other indulgences such as drinking of alcoholic liquor, 
should be kept within reasonable bounds, but this does not imply that there is 
anything inherently wrong in it.’72 It therefore concluded that the prohibition of off-
course ready-money gambling was ‘difficult to enforce, it has become out of date as a 
result of the development of many other forms of legal gambling, it gives an 
appearance of class distinctions, and is clearly ineffective as a method of checking 
gambling….’ It added that most witnesses felt that there was a need for a change in 
the law and that ‘the continued prohibition of cash betting off course is neither 
necessary nor desirable’.73 
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In addition, by the 1950s most political parties were using the 1934 Betting 
and Lotteries Act to run their own bingo, card clubs and other lottery money-raising 
activities. The Labour Party did this on a grand scale between about 1947 and 1953, 
before it became clear that in many cases they were breaking the law by running 
illegal public lotteries rather than the legal private lotteries permitted by the 1934 Act. 
In fact a Labour Party lottery survey in 1954 suggests that about a third of the Labour 
Party constituency agents would lose their posts if the lottery (lotteries including 
bingo, whist, and some other card games) was stopped.74 Gaming had become part of 
the accepted culture of political parties, and it is not surprising that the Conservative 
government and the opposition parties operated together to get the Small Lotteries and 
Gaming Act passed through Parliament in 1955 and 1956, in the hope that it would 
legalise their fund-raising activities. 
 On 25 November 1955 Ernest Davies, Labour MP for Enfield, promoted his 
private member’s Small Gaming Bill to rectify the confusing situation about lotteries 
or games of chance. He stated that ‘The laws of betting, lotteries and gaming are so 
complex, confusing and muddled in character and interconnected and so unequal in 
their incidence that the law is completely out of line with public opinion and common 
practice.75 He added that a vicar could run a raffle at a church bazaar but that if he 
sold a ticket outside the church hall, or inside it before the local MP had opened the 
bazaar, ‘he is in danger of being hauled off in a Black Maria.’  Indeed, Davies argues 
that if he, the lord chancellor, the home secretary, and the Chief Justice, played a 
rubber of bridge for so much as 1s. per hundred they ‘will be in danger of appearing 
before the beak at Marlborough next morning. The same state of affairs applies to 
lotteries run by clubs.’76 
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 The Small Gaming Act of 1956 allowed clubs and political organisation to 
offer better prices and to allow the public to join in bingo and other lotteries in the 
private clubs. It also set down the conditions for offering monetary prices. 
Unfortunately, however, it led to confusion. The 1934 Betting and Lottery Act 
allowed private lotteries to raise money for private clubs. The 1956 Act allowed the 
public into lotteries operated by clubs but did not allow the profits to be used for the 
benefit of the members of the private clubs; they could only be used for charity. This 
difference led to many clubs operating illegally by using the 1956 proceeds for their 
own members. In the end it proved necessary to clarify this situation again and in the 
wide-ranging Betting and Gaming Act of 1960 the Conservative government also 
took the opportunity to replace the 1906 Street Betting Act by introducing the 
licensed off-course book betting office. The decision to do this had already been taken 
in Cabinet. Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister, wanted a bill to regulate 
bookmakers by licensing them and allowing the formation of betting offices, a bill 
which would also ‘bring the tangled law on gaming into line with what is thought to 
be contemporary public opinion’.77 In effect it was implementing the findings of the 
Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming (1949-51) which had suggested 
the creation of licensed betting offices. Times had changed and the religious anti-
gambling lobby, though still present, could not stop this move. In the end government 
had come to accept that it was not possible to impose a law that was flouted on a 
regular daily basis by a majority of the population in a democratic state. 
VII 
The central argument of this chapter is that in the early twentieth century the working 
classes generally acted with restraint when it came to gambling and gaming, a view 
advocated by Carl Chinn and Mark Clapson who accept that the working classes liked 
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‘a bit of a flutter’. It rejects the view of the NAGL that the working classes gambled 
to excess and that this resulted in deleterious social and economic consequences. 
Rather it maintains the ubiquity of gambling which was an integral part of working-
class life. 
The NAGL was successful in getting the blatantly discriminatory Street 
Betting Act passed in 1906 but it soon proved to be unenforceable. Indeed, by the 
1920s most chief constables and the Home Office wanted the removal of the Act. The 
opposition of the Labour Party, however, still partly present after 1931, and the rising 
concern about the mushroom growth of the football pools greyhound racing and the 
Irish Hospital Sweepstake Lottery undermined the attempts to remove the 1906 Act 
during the inter-war years. However, this could not last forever. By the 1950s British 
society was changing rapidly and the Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and 
Gaming (1949-51) had concluded that the 1906 Street Betting Act, and indeed the 
1853 Betting Houses Act, were no longer relevant in a modern changing society. 
It is here that I return to my own starting point. In the 1950s I could not 
understand why off-course ready money gambling on horses was illegal. Equally I 
couldn’t understand why policeman would raid illegal bookmakers one day and place 
a bet with them the next. I couldn’t see why whist drives were illegal when they were 
so often used to raise money for local events, including the celebration of the Queen’s 
coronation in 1953. Why was it wrong for the working class to enjoy the same rights 
as the middle classes? 
My research has indicated no  great plot or conspiracy against the working 
classes but that there are many twists and turns in government attitudes. The actions 
of the Home Office, the impact of anti-gambling forces, the attitudes of the police, the 
evidence gathered for royal commissions and select committees, all ensured that there 
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is no straight course in the evolution of British social policy. These factors dictated 
the pace of events, and the oscillations in policy, but they did not necessarily dictate 
its direction; that was more conditioned by the needs of an increasingly democratising 
society which ultimately aimed to reduce social inequality. 
The working classes saw gambling and gaming as part of their contribution to 
this process of reducing inequalities in life. It was regarded by many of them as a 
form of self-help which could liven up their lives and offer them the occasional 
financial windfall to alleviate temporarily their poor economic situation. As Rowntree 
reflected at the end of the inter-war years, the working classes were often ‘in search of 
phantom fortunes’ but they were also realistic enough to know that their flutters were 
likely to bring only limited rewards. Small flutters for small rewards became part of 
the fabric of the economy and leisure of working-class households in the first six 
decades of the twentieth century. 
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